Aburi Meeting
Aburi Meeting to Avert
(Nigeria Civil War)
Nigeria Biafra War
Tape Recordings of Aburi Meeting
Transcript from the Tape Recordings of
Aburi Meeting of 5th to 7th January 1967
In Attendance:
Lt.-General Joe Ankrah of Ghana (Host)
Lt.-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, Chief of Army Staff of
Nigeria (announced as 'Supreme Commander'
while whereabouts of Ironsi was 'unknown')
Lt.-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military
Governor of Eastern Nigeria
Colonel Robert Adeyinka Adebayo, Military
Governor of Western Nigeria
Lt.-Colonel Hassan Katsina, Military Governor of
Northern Nigeria
Lt.-Colonel David Ejoor, Military Governor of Mid-
Western Nigeria
Major Mobolaji Johnson, Military Governor of
Lagos
Alhaji Kam Selem, Deputy Inspector-General of
Police
Mr. T. Omo-Bare Commodore Akinwale Wey,
Chief of Naval Staff
The Main Topic:
Re-Organizing Nigeria
Reference: Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria
January 1966-July 1967 (Vol.1)
A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE Oxford University, 1971
Attitudes at Aburi
a. How the military looks at the politicians
General Ankrah (Ghana): I will not like to dwell
rigidly on any point whatsoever because I feel
this is a domestic affair of Nigeria and, as I have
always said, it is not difficult for military people
to understand each other. It is a saying that if
Generals were to meet and discuss frontiers,
wars or even go into the details to forestall war,
there will never be any differences or
discrepancies but unity and understanding.
There will be no war because the two old boys
will meet at the frontier and tell each other: 'Old
boy, we are not going to commit our boys to die,
come on, let us keep the politicians out' and that
is the end. I am quite confident that having met
here to-day, you will continue and achieve what
you are here for.
What I want to stress is this, that through the
annals of history we have not seen failures with
military statesmen and when military personnel
do take over the reins of Government they have
proved their worth and, I am sure and confident
that the Military regimes that have been saddled
with the onerous responsibility of rebuilding and
reconstructing the various countries in Africa will
not let us down.
You are aware that in Nigeria now the whole
world is looking up to you as military men and if
there is any failure to reunify or even bring
perfect understanding to Nigeria as a whole, you
will find that the blame will rest with us all
through the centuries. There is no gainsaying
this whatsoever.
Whatever the situation we are soldiers and
soldiers are always statesmen not politicians.
They deal with a little bit of politics and
diplomacy when the time comes but they are
statesmen. The people first and they themselves
second but if you think like the politicians do
that they want fame or they want to be heard of
and neglect your people then, of course, I am
quite sure that we as soldiers will live to regret,
even our future generations will live to regret.
They will be blaming us whenever our names are
called or mentioned....
Major Johnson: Gentlemen, if I can start talking
on this one, please do not think I am taking
undue advantage. Quite honestly I think we all
know what brought this country to where we are
to-day and while talking yesterday Emeka [first
name of Lt.-Col. Ojukwu] touched on a point of
how, due to the situation, the politicians got
what they have been waiting for to come in.
While I very much welcome this Item 4 and
while I know that definitely we are not going to
be in Government forever, I will like to say that,
please for the next six months let us leave
everything that will bring the politicians back
into the limelight out of the question. Let us go
on all these things we have been discussing
since yesterday because this is on the basis at
which we can get our country back on its feet.
Once we can get the papers on these things out
and we see them working then we can call the
Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee to come and
discuss but for now they are just going to
confuse the issues more if you bring them out to
come and talk anything again. I will say let the
Military Government continue for now and after
working for six months and we see how far we
can go before we start thinking of calling these
people back.
Commodore Wey: I 100% support what you
have said. Candidly if there had ever been a
time in my life when I thought somebody had
hurt me sufficiently for me to wish to kill him it
was when one of these fellows opened his mouth
too wide. I think we should let them stay where
they are for the moment. It was simply because
we could not get together and handle our affairs.
Now that we have established the basis under
which we can work please let us leave them
where they are and let us try and see how far
we can work.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this statement, Gentlemen,
a lot depends on what the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Committee is. I agree indeed that regarding
other Regions it was indeed a platform for
politicians, in the East it was not. I did not send
politicians to it but be it as it may, if we say we
are going to continue then we must obviously
get quite satisfied the terms of running this thing
properly. We have got to be able to meet and I
said it outside and I repeat it here, I, as the
Military Governor of the East cannot meet
anywhere in Nigeria where there are Northern
troops.
b. The events of 29 July and the issue of
Supreme Commander: the Colonels speak
Major Johnson: Sir, before we go on if I may say
something. I am happy we have got to this point
again. I had wanted to take this Conference back
all along because as my people say 'If you still
have lice in your head, there will still be blood on
your fingers :' May I ask one question,
gentlemen, is there a Central Government in
Nigeria to-day?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: That question is such a simple
one and anyone who has been listening to what I
have been saying all the time would know that I
do not see a Central Government in Nigeria to-
day.
Major Johnson: Thank you, Gentlemen. I think
this is the crux of the whole thing and I think if I
can take you back this can be a personality clash
or something.
I am saying here to-day that this is the
backbone of our problem. As far as the Governor
of the East is concerned there is no central
government in Nigeria. You say, Supreme
Commander, but as far as he is concerned there
is no Supreme Commander. I think this is where
we must start from, gentlemen. Why is he not
accepting that there is a Supreme Commander
and we accept there is a Supreme Commander.
This brings me to this Conference that was held
in August. As was rightly said, this Committee
was a Steering Committee. We are all Military
personnel here and we know one thing. We have
all been pointing accusing fingers at politicians
that they used to take military decisions without
military men.
The main problem now is that as far as the East
is concerned, there is no Central Government.
Why? This is what we must find out. I mentioned
something about personality clash. I remember
that there was a long letter written by the
Governor of the East sometime ago referring to
the hierarchy in the Army, the policy on seniority
and things like that. He said among other things
in the letter that if even Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon
is Supreme Commander is he not right to ask
whether it is for a period or something. For all
the East knows the former Supreme Commander
is only missing and until such a time that they
know his whereabouts they do not know any
other Supreme Commander. These are the
points that have been brought out by the East.
Gentlemen, we said this morning that we have
come with open minds and we must hit the nail
at the head. The East should tell us now what
are their views, what are the conditions they
want to demand before they can say that there
is a Central Government in Nigeria. For all we
know now, nobody has seceded, the East is still
part of Nigeria, the West, the North and we
know Nigeria as a Federation.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: The Mid-West please.
Major Johnson: And Lagos. Nigeria is still a
Federation and in a Federation there is a Central
Government. Where is this Central Government
and who is Head of this Central Government?
Gentlemen, unless we clear this one, all what we
are discussing will not be good enough. What
are the conditions the East demand before they
can recognise what the rest of us recognise as
the Central Government?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I agree with you in essence on
what you have just said, Bolaji [First name of
Major Johnson], but the last bit is badly put. If
you will forgive me it is not 'What conditions do
they demand before....'
If the problem is that we are trying to see how
to solve the problem of Government in the
centre then I will come in. I will seek your
indulgence as I go a little bit back into what a
number of people would perhaps wish to call
history.
At a certain stage, we all accepted General Ironsi
as the Supreme Commander and Head of the
National Military Government. During his regime
we met or rather whilst he was about we met as
often as it was practicable, and sat and jointly
discussed and took decisions. When the
decisions were good we all shared the kudos,
when those decisions were bad it is only natural
that we should all share the blame.
On the 29th of July, whilst he was visiting the
Governor of the West, he was said to be
besieged in that residence in Ibadan and later
kidnapped, further abducted. Subsequent to
that, it appeared in his absence the normal thing
was whoever is the next senior person to
manage the affairs of this country until such a
time as he reappeared; or it was necessary he
was deposed or if he had suffered certain
accident, until such a time as the circumstances
were made known. Which ever is the case, the
question of the headship of the Government and
the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
would normally be subjected to a discussion and
agreement unless, of course, one party felt he
was strong enough to push everybody aside and
get to the seat.
When this affair of the 29th July occurred, I
remember for certain, the first 24 hours nobody
thought it necessary to contact the East from
Lagos. I made the contact later and I know the
advice I gave Brigadier Ogundipe at that time. I
said to him, 'Sir, the situation is so confused that
I feel that somebody must take control
immediately. Also, I would suggest that you go
on to the air and tell the country what has
happened and that you were taking control of
the situation.' Then I was told about concern for
the whole country. I knew that if this thing
resolved itself into factions we would get
ourselves into so much trouble that we would
never or we would find it difficult to get out. I
maintained and still do that the answer would
have been for the responsible officers of the
Army to get together thereby trying to get the
Army together to solve the problem that we had
on our hands. I said to him 'As soon as you have
made your speech I guarantee you within 30
minutes, I needed time to write my own, in 30
minutes I would come on to the air in the East
and say that I, the entire Army in the East and
the entire people in the East wholeheartedly
support you.'
Forgive me, David [first name of Lt.-Col. Ejoor],
that I have never said this to you, but I told him
too that I was sure that within fifteen minutes
you would say the same in the interest of the
country as a whole. He told me that he thought
it was a good idea but it did not seem likely that
it would be accepted by the faction.
Very soon after, I had occasion to talk to you,
Jack [nickname of Lt.-Col. Gowon], I did mention
amongst other things, two things. The first one
was this question of solving the problem and I
thought the Army together should solve it. I said
also that any break at this time from our
normalline would write in something into the
Nigerian Army which is bigger than all of us and
that thing is indiscipline. How can you ride above
people's heads and sit in Lagos purely because
you are at the Head of a group who have their
fingers poised on the trigger? If you do it you
remain forever a living example of that
indiscipline which we want to get rid of because
tomorrow a Corporal will think because he has
his finger on the trigger he could just take over
the company from the Major Commanding the
company and so on. I knew then that we were
heading for something terrible. Despite that and
by force of circumstance as we did talk on the
telephone, I think twice, you brought up the
question of supreme command and I made quite
plain my objections, but despite those objections
you announced yourself as the Supreme
Commander. Now, Supreme Commander by
virtue of the fact that you head or that you are
acceptable to people who had mutinied against
their Commander, kidnapped him and taken him
away ? By virtue of the support of Officers and
men who had in the dead of night murdered
their brother Officers, by virtue of the fact that
you stood at the head of a group who had
turned their brother Officers from the Eastern
Region out of the barracks which they shared ?
Our people came home, there are other
circumstances which even make the return more
tragic. Immediately after I had opportunity to
speak to you again, I said on that occasion that
there had been too much killing in Nigeria and it
was my sincere hope that we can stop these
killings. I said then, and have continued to say
that in the interest of peace I would co-operate
with you to stop the fighting, to stop the killing
but I would not recognise.
I would not recognise because as I said we have
a Supreme Commander who is missing. I would
not recognise and to underline the validity of
that claim of mine you appointed another Officer,
be he senior to you, Acting Governor in the
West, presumably acting for the Governor who
was then abducted and that I saw no reason
why your position would not then be acting.
From there I think we started parting our ways
because it was clear that the hold on Lagos was
by force of conquest. Now, these things do
happen in the world, we are all military Officers.
If an Officer is dead 'Oh! he was a fine soldier',
we drop the national flag on him, we give him
due honours and that is all. The next person
steps in. So, the actual fact in itself is a small
thing with military men but hierachy, order is
very important, discipline are sine qua non for
any organisation which prides itself for being
called an Army. So, the mutiny had occurred, the
mutineer seemed in control of the North, the
West, Lagos. By international standards when
that does happen then a de facto situation is
created immediately where whoever is in a
position get a de facto recognition of himself in a
position over the area he controls. In this
situation, Nigeria resolved itself into three areas.
The Lagos, West and North group, the Mid-West,
the East. What should have been done is for us
to get round to discuss the future, how to carry
on in the absence of our Supreme Commander.
We could not get together because of the
situation so we sent our accredited
representatives, delegates of Governments and
personal representatives of Governors to Lagos
to try and resolve certain issues on bringing
normalcy to the country. They met and
unanimously agreed to certain points.
Bolaji, I think in fact from this, if nothing else
you do know what I consider went wrong.
Perhaps at this juncture I might stop for others
to contribute otherwise I would go on and tell
you what I consider to be my solution to the
problem even now, irrespective of the amount of
water that had gone under the bridge. I think
there is still a solution provided we are honest
with ourselves and we are really very serious
about solving this problem. I agree with you it is
vital, it is crucial, without it I do not think we can
really go anywhere. I leave it for the time being.
Col. Adebayo: I think Emeka has narrated what
happened on the 29th July and thereafter. We
have all agreed and I am sure you still agree
that what we are looking for now is a solution for
the future. I do not want us to go into the past
anymore, we want a solution for the future. I will
suggest with the permission of the other
members here that we ask Emeka to give us his
solution. Thereafter there might be some others
too who would have their own solutions, then we
can make a compromise from the solutions we
get.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: Gentlemen, General Ankrah told
us not to go back into the past, if we are to go
back into the past we will sit here for two
months talking. Let us forget the past and I
agree with Robert [first name of Col. Adebayo]
that we ask the East to tell us their solution. If
their solution is quite acceptable then we adopt
it, amend or whatever we think is good for the
country for peace. We are not going to say
ourselves what efforts we have put in
individually; let us find peace for Nigeria. This is
the major issue, unless this is done whatever we
are going to discuss is not going to work out
well.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I believe that before we start
suggesting solutions we must examine certain
principles vis a vis the Governors. To me, we
should not go too far into history but there is
one valid point which must be considered and
that is the coup we have had so far. The January
15 one was a failure and the Army came in to
correct it, the one of the 29th I personally
believe was a mutiny to start with but it has now
turned out to be a coup. If it is a coup we have
to ask ourselves 'is it a successful coup or is it a
partial one ?' I believe it is a partial one, it is not
a fully successful one. This is the main point
which has brought us here, trying to negotiate
as opposed to receiving orders from the
Commander. I think we must bear this in mind in
reaching a decision or a Resolution affecting the
re-organisation of the Army. To-day, the Army is
faced with four main problems.
Firstly, the problem of leadership;
Secondly, the crisis of confidence amongst
Officers and amongst the soldiers;
Thirdly, the chain of command is badly
disrupted; and Fourthly, we cannot now have
any Nigerian from anywhere serving in the same
unit as an effective unit of the Army.
These are bare facts and whatever solution we
evolve must go to solve these main problems. I
leave these basic principles and what solutions
offered should be considered alongside these
problems.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: David spoke on re-organisation
but the current topic is on Bolaji's point which
Emeka narrated. I think this is the major point.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: When you consider leadership you
have to tell us what happened to the former
leader.
Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I think I have
been properly placed in this issue from the 15th
of January up till now. Unfortunately, I do not
put them down because I think I can carry quite
a bit in my head. The whole issue is unfortunate,
it has happened and it has happened. The truth
now is that we want to repair, we do not intend
to point accusing fingers at anybody.
When the trouble of the 29th July started I was
present, you came and joined us, therefore, I
can tell any other person better. I was there
when you phoned Brigadier Ogundipe and I
knew what you said. At one stage, it was even
said that I carried him in my ship and took him
out to sea.
I must say one thing that it is impossible for any
man to expect to command any unit which he
has not got control over. Bolaji would bear
witness, he was there, he started it. He was the
one who went out first and came back to say
that a Private refused to take orders from him; it
all happened in the Police Headquarters.
The Inspector-General complained, I went into it
and I said if they cannot take orders from an
Army Officer like themselves they will not take
from a Naval Officer. I retired and called
Brigadier Ogundipe. He went out and if an
ordinary Sergeant can tell a Brigadier 'I do not
take orders from you, until my Captain comes,' I
think this was the limit and this is the truth
about it. Therefore, it would have been very
unfair to Ogundipe or any other person for that
matter to take command and there is no point
accepting to command a unit over which you
have no control.
It was after that negotiations started, I do not
know what conversation went on between
Ogundipe and Jack. On the long run I was
consulted and what I have just said now was
exactly my advice. Bob was with me, I went out
and we did not finish until two o'clock in the
morning. Jack then came into the issue, how he
got there I have got the story; he himself has
never told me. I have been doing private
investigations myself. I knew how he got into
Ikeja and how it came about.
I want to repeat that if we did not have the
opportunity of having Jack to accept, God knows
we would have been all finished. If you
remember, you dragged me out, things changed.
I do not think people can appreciate the
difficulty we were in, therefore, if anybody
accepted to lead them candidly I doff my hat for
him, I accept it purely from the point of respect.
If 55 million people can be saved let us forget
everything about position and for God's sake
because of our 55 million people let us forget
our personal pride. Whether it was a coup or a
mutiny let us forget it.
If this man comes out and everybody accepts
him, please let us accept him.
One thing I would like to repeat, I am a sailor
and I want to remain a sailor. I do not see why
you soldiers should not remain soldiers. We were
not trained to be politicians, let us run the
Government, draw up a Constitution, hand-over
to the politicians and we get back into our
uniforms.
Whatever people may say, I think I will take this
advantage to tell you here that when all of you
were appointed Governors I was one of those
who sat and appointed you Governors but right
does not come into this at all; please let us
forget personal feelings. I know my rank but if it
is the wish of the 55 million people, please let us
put our hearts into our pockets and forget our
personal pride.
Personally, I am 100 per cent in support that we
should mention the whereabouts of Ironsi, even
I have advised on this. When that has been
done, he is a Head of State and he should be
given the proper honour; thereafter, who-so-
ever is in the Chair now let us help him to run
the country peacefully, no more bloodshed, we
have shed enough. We cannot create why should
we destroy. If we can help to save please let us
do so but we must say the whereabouts of
Ironsi. He is a Head of State and we should give
him his due respect as a Head of State. It is a
temporary issue, four, five years, maybe I would
have retired by then.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It is all well and good,
Gentlemen, but I will be vehement on this. The
point is that if a room is dirty you do not sweep
the dirt under the carpet because whenever you
raise the carpet the dirt will be there. It is not so
simple as all that. Indeed, on the very principle
that you have enunciated here, it is a question of
command and control. I like to know who will
stand up here and tell me that he commands
and controls the Eastern Army or the Army in
the East.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: You alone.
Commodore Wey: I can tell you also here now
that you are doing it illegally because when we
had the first Government no Governor was
supposed to have the command of any Army.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: You have started on the basis of
the principles of command and control. If you
control a group who will take orders from you,
according to you, everybody doffs his hat, well
done. Right, that person you doff your hat to
cannot command and control those under him
and indeed those of the East. What do you do to
that?
Commodore Wey: That is why we are here.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is why we are here to solve
the problem. You command the East, if you want
to come into Nigeria come into Nigeria and that
is that.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am not out.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is the problem but if we are
to go into the basis of coup and mutiny we will
be here for months. I have seen an Army mutiny
in Kano and if you see me trembling you will
know what a mutiny is. You were the first I rang
and for two good days I saw a real mutiny when
a C.O. of Northern origin commanding soldiers of
Northern origin had to run away. Please, we
have all come not to raise issues of the past, let
us forget the past and come to the problem. Say
what you want to say, let us go into the matter
and discuss it.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Before we ask Emeka to give a
solution will it not be advisable that somebody
should say what happened to Ironsi Major
Johnson: I support him fully.
Alhaji Kam Selem: If I may just say a few words.
I am not a military man, but at that time it was
just impossible for anybody else to take
command of the country. As far as I know even
the present Supreme Commander had to be
persuaded to take over the Government. The
Senior Officers you are talking about could not
possibly accept the leadership of the country at
that time. What could we do in a situation like
that and the country was kept for 48 hours and
nobody knew what was happening. As far as I
know he has no ambition to remain in this
present post. As soon as the situation in the
country returns to normal and the problems are
solved he will resign. I associate myself with all
the Governors who said we should give the
present Supreme Commander the respect he
deserves. I was present through the whole
trouble from January 15 and most of the things
took place in my office. As other speakers said, if
the Governor of the East has a solution let us
hear the solution.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: Before we hear the solution, we
want to know what happened to Ironsi and
Fajuyi.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: If a public statement is required
I am prepared to make one now. I have never
been afraid to make a public statement
anywhere. Left to me it would have been
announced the day I knew about it and
immediately I took the people that should know
into confidence. I have explained this to my
Colleagues in absolute sincerity and honesty. I
had wanted to make the announcement before
this meeting but unfortunately I was unable to
do so. In any case, I want to make this
announcement very shortly, and if you require it
now I will say it. If you wish I can give the
information in confidence and we can work on
that.
Alhaji Kam Selem: I think the statement should
be made in Nigeria so that the necessary honour
can be given.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This was what happened after
the January coup. We agreed to announce the
names of all the Senior Officers killed but there
was fear all over. Let us combine the whole story
ready, do the whole thing respectably and solve
the problem.
Commodore Wey: Gentlemen, I would like to
suggest this. I do not think there is anybody
sitting on this table who would say that until
today he did not know about the situation. In
short, it is a public statement that is required
and now we are going to have it in the scribe's
book. We know the position and an
announcement will be made as soon as we get
back home.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: On this question of
announcement and as you have all diagnosed, a
lot depends on the public statement. The longer
it is kept everything would remain uncertain, so
that it is necessary to determine here how we
are going to make this announcement. When?
Col. Adebayo: The best thing is to tell us here
now what happened to Ironsi then when we get
home and we issue our communique, we can
make the public statement.
Lt.-Col. Gowon There is a Head of State and at
the moment we are all assuming something
serious or tragic has happened to him. He is a
Head of State, we cannot just sit down here and
discuss it. As I said, it is my responsibility to
make the announcement in due course and I will
make it in due course. I have already made up
my mind that this would be done within the next
week or two.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I am not trying to be difficult on
the issue but perhaps you will agree that this
issue affects the area I am governing more than
any other area. If it is in due course that the
announcement is going to be made I would
respectfully suggest that a statement would be
in due course. Let us decide, if we want the
Secretaries to move out, they can move out. If
we want everybody out, let them go out for five
minutes, the microphones can be taken away or
we can move down there. Gentlemen, if even
the circumstances mean quite a lot, we can
move away from this table, have a quick chat
and come back to continue.
Commodore Wey: I support that.
c. The problem of the army
Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think all of us have at one time
or the other discussed the situation in the
country with regard to the reorganisation of the
Army. With reference to 3 (b) 'the
implementation of the agreement reached on
9th August' this is on the disposition of Army
personnel, that they should go back to their
region of origin. This recommendation was made
by the Ad Hoc Committee which consisted of
Secretaries to the Military Governors, advisers
and representatives of Regional Governors. They
did not have any mandate to decide anything
other than to come and express their feelings
and make recommendations. Their
recommendations, of course, would be
considered by the Regional Governors. I think
the recommendation says:
It was accordingly agreed that as far as possible
the Army personnel should be posted to barracks
in their Regions of origin with immediate effect
as an interim measure. Having regard to its
peculiar position, the question of maintenance of
peace and security in Lagos should be left with
the Supreme Commander in consultation with
the Military Governors.
This question of movement of troops to their
Region of origin arose from the fact that at the
time there was so much misunderstanding, so
much clash and killings between troops of
Northern origin and troops of Eastern origin. I
discussed this on the telephone with Emeka and
I told him that 'Honestly, my consideration is to
save the lives of these boys and the only way to
do it is to remove the troops back to barracks in
their Region of origin. ' Emeka also told me that
there were a number of threats to his life and
any moment the troops in Enugu of Northern
origin could mutiny and his life and the lives of
the people of Eastern Nigeria would be in
danger. I agreed with him and said the best
thing we could do was to send them back to
their Region of origin and some of the boys were
already escaping from their units. We agreed to
repatriate all troops of Northern origin from the
East and those of Eastern origin particularly Ibo
speaking from the other major units because the
clashes were severest within major units.
As far as I was concerned I did not think the
problem was in other units because the feeling
at that time was that it was the Northern versus
Eastern boys as a result of some things that had
happened in the past which had been with us for
a long time. If you remember, Emeka, you said
something about the boys in the services
returning and I agreed to this reluctantly but as
far as the major units were concerned, I thought
that was necessary. If we can mix up a little now
this will certainly be a good basis for future
coming together. If we separate totally we will
sort of probably get further and further apart
and each Region may have an independent
Army. I think I have said enough as far as the
review of the current situation with reference to
the organisation of the Army is concerned and
the implementation of the agreement of 9th
August. I think we can now discuss this point
and later on come to some sort of agreement on
the subject....
Lt.-Col. Gowon: I think we can now go to the
question of the organisation of the Nigerian
Army. There was a Committee that was set up in
August or September to think on the re-
organisation of the Nigerian Army and I think
they produced a paper which we sent to all
Military Governors to comment upon and from
that we will work out the question of re-
organisation. This is something on a nation's
security and I think we should be very careful
about it. This is the truth about defence in the
world today.
If I can say something about my idea for the re-
organisation of the Army. I will be very brief. I
think that the Nigerian Army today probably
would not be able to remain exactly as it was
before January 15 or July 29. There has been so
much fear generated between ourselves as a
result of events since the beginning of 1966 that
there is something to be said towards the
modification of the present stand. There are two
extremes on this. One sort of saying that we
remain exactly as we were before January 15
and the other which says, we go completely on
Regional basis. I think those are the two
extremes. In the middle of course, you have got
the possibility of having an Army predominantly
people of that Region in their Region.
If I can express my own view or if you like you
can call it my philosophy. As far as the Nigerian
Army is concerned we cannot get everybody to
where he was before January 15 or July 29. If
we want to go to the other extreme of having
Regional Armies we are trying to have the
beginning of the arms race which is what we are
trying to do away with. These Regional Armies
will turn into private armies and before we know
what we are doing we will start having internal
troubles within the private armies and, of
course, the whole country will be in flames. My
thinking is that I do not feel that the basis of
trust and confidence has been completely
broken, it has been disrupted, it has been
shaken but with little mixing and jingling we
have got between people, I am quite convinced
that it would form the basis of probably a more
realistic mixing together in the future. If every
Region wants to go its own way and think one
day we will meet again, I feel that it may not
work properly....
On immediate re-organisation, one would like to
see first of all proper command and control.
Secondly, we all agreed that most of the soldiers
in each Region should come from that Region.
The East and the Mid-West are lucky they have
all their people there, unfortunately in the West,
I have not got enough Westerners in the place
and the people in the West are very afraid now
because a lot of their own people were killed
during January, July and August. I have tried to
clear the fear from them but still they insist on
having more Yorubas than they have at the
moment. I know there are not enough Yorubas
in the Army and those who are there are mostly
tradesmen. I do not want to disrupt other units,
but from what I said when we last met in Lagos,
we can find an immediate solution to the Yoruba
problem. That is, try and continue on the normal
quota business which we started in Zaria and as
a crash programme we should use Abeokuta
area as a crash programme training centre for
Westerners, for Mid-Westerners who cannot go
to Zaria and possibly for the Easterners who
cannot go to Zaria at the moment.
I still feel very strongly about this, this is the
only way to clear the problem of the Yorubas and
this is the only way we can get the confidence of
the people of the West because they feel they
are the only people now being helped because
there are not enough Yorubas in the Army. The
moment we can clear this side and we get
command and control properly established, I do
not think there will be any more problem That is
the immediate reorganisation which I would like
now but the long term one is on the paper given
to us by the committee which was appointed. It
is a very good paper and I am still commenting
on it.
d. The information media blame
Lt.-Col. Gowon: On the Government Information
Media, I think all the Government Information
Media in the country have done terribly bad.
Emeka would say the New Nigerian has been
very unkind to the East
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: And the Post which I pay for.
Lt.-Col. Gowon Sometime I feel my problem is
not with anyone but the Outlook.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: All the other information media
have done a lot. When the Information Media in
a country completely closed their eyes to what
was happening, I think it is a dangerous thing.
Major Johnson: Let us agree it is the situation.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: All of them have committed one
crime or the other.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: The Outlook is the worst of
them.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The Outlook is not the worst,
the Post which we all in fact pay for is the worst
followed closely by the New Nigerian.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Let us make a general
statement on all of them, no distinction.
Lt.-Col. Gowon I think we agreed that all
Government Information Media should desist
from making inflammatory publications that
would worsen the situation in the country.
e. The administrative arrangements for the
future
Lt.-Col. Gowon I personally think Decree 34 is
worth looking into. I agree that the Supreme
Military Council should sit on this, I think even in
one of my addresses I said I would do away with
any Decree that certainly tended to go towards
too much centralisation and if you feel strongly
about this, very good, they can be looked into. I
think we will resurrect this one when we go back
home and take decisions on them.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: We will not discuss the details
but I am anxious that we find solutions.
Whatever we do here we set a time for because
there has been so much going on. What I am
bringing up at this meeting are the things which
generate the sort of suspicion we are trying very
hard to avoid. If we can set a time limit I would
be agreeable that all the parts of Decrees and
Decrees that assume overcentralisation will be
repealed.
Commodore Wey: Will be looked into, supposing
it is a good one?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Centralisation is a word that
stinks in Nigeria to-day.
For that 10,000 people have been killed....
Lt.-Col. Hassan: We are not going back on the
question of Government. I think we better make
it clear what form of Government because up till
now Emeka has been saying he does not
recognise the Federal Government of Nigeria.
This is the main point. Let us make it clear, is
the East agreeing to the present Federal
Government ? If not what is the East thinking
should be the form of Federal Government?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I have said that a Government
by a Council run perhaps the same as we have
to-day with a Chairman with limited powers and
we limit the powers here....
Col. Adebayo: I do not think we should flog this
thing too much. I think quite rightly a lot of
powers of the Regions have been taken from
them by centralising most of them, this was by
some of the Decrees made by Lagos before 29th
July. I think this must be looked into, the
Decrees repealed and the powers must go back
to the Regions.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: Why not use the word,
reviewed. We can hold a meeting when we get
back home and review these Decrees.
Col. Adebayo: Can we then say that all our
Solicitors-General get together and discuss these
Decrees?
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Let us go through the points we
know, we know we had a Federation before 15th
January, the powers go back to the Regions and
from there we try to put things right. All this talk
about review, review and for the next six months
they will not be reviewed.
Commodore Wey: As far as I am concerned this
Government is known as the Military
Government and all the Decrees produced so far
were produced by the Army, therefore, let us not
blame ourselves, let us look into the Decrees
and find the ones we can send back. You were in
the Council when we made these Decrees.
Alhaji Kam Selem: I think the point he made is
good but it is not a matter for us to decide. We
have to look into these things. Let the Solicitors-
General meet, bring their lists and put up
recommendations.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The 'legal boys' have looked
into it and said 'repeal'. If some 'legal boys' in
some regions refuse to work it is not my fault.
These are the things that cause a lot of trouble.
Col. Adebayo: Let us give them a date when
they should meet....
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: The Governors should go back
and tell their men to meet at Benin on a certain
date.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: The Ministry of Justice in Lagos
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: He will give the instruction in
Lagos and I will give the instruction in Enugu.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: Lagos is the one to say let us
meet at such and such a date.
Col. Adebayo: We are giving them instruction
from this meeting.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: It is not Lagos. This is the
crucial point about this Government.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: Let us take this question
honestly, the East has not recognised the Federal
Government, I think you better secede and let
the three of us join together.
Lt.-Gen. Ankrah: There is no question of
secession when you come here.
Col. Adebayo: What he is saying is that let this
meeting decide on the date they are meeting
somewhere and when we get back home we will
tell our Solicitors-General that they are meeting
at such and such a date.
Major Johnson: We can take a date here but I
see what Lt.-Col. Hassan is getting at. Usually
anything you do in a Federal Government,
instructions come from the nerve centre and that
nerve centre for all we know is Lagos. It is Lagos
that will tell the Regions 'You send your
Solicitors-General to meet at Benin at so and so
date....' Personally, I feel we have a duty to the
people, we should forget about ourselves at the
moment. We must put behind our minds that we
are all soldiers and we are all likely to go back to
the Army after this. All we need now is to find a
solution to the problem of Nigeria and that
solution must be a sincere one....
I know the Ghana system is working well; if we
had started with that system from the beginning
it would have been a different thing. There is
nothing wrong with our own system, only the
timing is bad, it will be bad if we change it now
and I think we must make our own organisation
workable....
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I have to come in again. I do
not agree with 90 per cent of what you have just
said. I have used the analogy of sweeping dirt
under the carpet, I again used the question of
the ostrich posture burying our heads in the
sand and hoping everything is all right. The fact
remains that in the year 1966, Nigeria has gone
through a turmoil and as Jack himself said, the
basis for real unity in this..
Lt.-Col. Gowon: Unitary system of Government,
please, not the question of unity.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: You made an important and
realistic declaration in which you said' Our
difficulties in the past have been how to agree
on the form which such an association should
take and the task of my Government', meaning
yours, 'is to provide facilities for the widest and
fullest consultations at all levels on all vital
matters of national interest before a decision is
taken.' In the past we have been too
presumptuous and have acted on such
presumptions. Too often we presume that we
know what the people desired. In one or two
cases hasty decisions were taken without
sufficient consultation. Based on that and
knowing what has gone, therefore any
government set up now in Nigeria that does not
take into cognisance Regional loyalties is
complete eye-wash. The Federal Government or
support of Gowon or support of anybody, or of
Emeka, whatever it is, is neither here nor there.
What we want is that certain things were wrong,
what are they, let us put them right. When I said
Chairman, you can call him Chairman and still
call him Governor. The fact still remains, it is
really a nomenclature on functions and this is
the crux of the matter. On the basis on which he
assumed the position in Lagos, it is not possible
for the East to accept blindly the leadership from
Lagos. For this we have fought, we have
struggled for in the past few years. For this the
East will continue to struggle and fight if
necessary, but thank God we have said there will
be no force.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: You can thank God but your
attitude is what will say.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The point I am making is that
this Council of ours whoever we decide should sit
on the Chair would have limited functions and
only act with our agreement. This was what
caused the last downfall. We all know it, there
were so many times that we quarreled about
this, argued about this, a number of things went
down and not fully understood elsewhere. After
all, we were all there when Decree No. 34 was
made. The point was, amongst the Governors
and senior officers, we knew, and we saw it and
left it. The people did not, they felt it and re-
acted, so we are told. If we are not going to fall
into that trap again let us here agree that
whoever sits on the chair can only act after
consultation . . . and his action would, of course,
be limited by our own agreement....
The question of Government, Gentlemen. It
would be entirely unrealistic not to take into full
cognisance what has happened in the country.
There was a mutiny in the Army on January 15,
Army leaders from all parts of the country got
together halted it and set up a Government.
Until May there was a massacre which the Army
leaders in their entirety regretted; based on the
good faith generated by the realistic way in
which the Army or the Armed Forces tackled the
problem, it was possible for populations to
continue to go back to their areas of domicile
and continue living side by side with one
another.
Come July, there was another mutiny in the
Army as a result of which Jack assumed the title
Supreme Commander. This title certainly is
contrary to my own views as a member of the
Supreme Military Council.... By September the
molestations and the killings of Easterners had
assumed such large proportions that Easterners
everywhere outside the East lost complete faith
in a Federal Government that could not offer the
basic need to their citizen, that is to offer the
citizen protection. The citizens from the East,
therefore, sought that protection within their
ethnic groups in the East. Contrary to
sentiments and all advice, everybody thought
the East was going to revenge.
I will say this here because it is no boast that
but for my own personality in the crisis the East
would have thrown itself completely into a
revenge. I halted it because I foresaw that
anybody that started an inter-tribal civil war
would never be able to control it. I was
absolutely certain that once we get into civil war
it would take us at least 25 years to sort out.
Contrary to all expectation I sent our delegates
from the East to the Ad Hoc Constitutional
Conference. During this, contrary to what should
have been indeed the Military Government's way
of doing things, I think a genuine mistake,
politicians found themselves for the first time in
the forefront of national discussions and, as
usual instead of facing the problem before them
sought to gain personal triumphs and
advantage. The East at the Conference was not
doing very well, the molestations continued, the
gory details I will spare you....
In this case unfortunately, Gentlemen, Officers
and men of Eastern Nigeria origin who had
moved from other parts of the country know the
names, the faces of individuals who perpetrated
these atrocities. Mention a name, we know who
killed him, mention somebody we know who at
least hounded him out of his barracks. So,
Gentlemen, for as long as that situation exists
men from Eastern Nigeria would find it utterly
impossible to stay in the same barracks, feed in
the same mess, fight from the same trenches as
men in the Army from Northern Nigeria, they
would find this impossible because we know it.
My policy has been that of ensuring the
prevention of further killing. If we do not take
cognisance of all these and we put our men
together and mix up we write in Gentlemen,
vendetta into our Armed Forces and once it
becomes vendetta it becomes extremely difficult
for us to solve because they will stay by force in
the same barracks but each Commanding Officer
will never be sure when his day will come.
For these basic reasons, separation of the forces,
the separation of the population, I, in all
sincerity, in order to avoid further friction and
further killing, do submit that the only realistic
form of Government to-day until tempers can
cool is such that will move people slightly apart
and a Government that controls the various
entities through people of their areas. It is better
that we move slightly apart and survive, it is
much worse that we move closer and perish in
the collision. Therefore, I say no single one
person to-day in Nigeria can command the entire
loyalty of the people of Nigeria. People can
command loyalties of various groups and,
therefore, to save the suspicion, to enable us
settle down it is essential that whatever form of
Government we have in the centre must be
limited and controlled by a consensus which we
all agree. It is easier for people at the top to be
reasonable, it is a different thing for people
lower down and it is that that makes me say
that Nigeria wide content should be at the
highest possible level until such a time as
tempers have cooled and tensions have come
down. This is the basic principle, if we are
agreeable on it then we go into the matters of
detail.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: I do agree basically with the
principles that have been mentioned by Emeka,
but starting from May, I think, in his statement
and in what you mentioned earlier, we that are
here to-day know what we have done and we
know what we have been doing to console and
to stop the killings of the people of the East. On
the other side, you may not know that all of us
here on this table have done so much also,
risking our lives and, as you mentioned, the
whole thing is at the lower level. If you know
how much it is at the lower level and how much
we have tried to console the people to stop all
these movements and mass killings, you will
give me and others a medal tonight.
However, I do agree that at the moment the
confidence at the lower level has to be restored
and it will take time to get confidence because it
is a known fact that the confidence now both in
the East and in the North is not yet there. We
have tried our best to see that the ordinary man
in the street understands the difficulties as
already mentioned by Emeka that may face the
country, a complete civil war. However, we have
done our best and we will continue to do our
best but all the same I agree that whatever form
of association we are to discuss has to be at the
top; to make me believe that tomorrow a
Northern soldier will stay in the same barracks
within the next few months with an Eastern
soldier, the confidence is just not there. With the
civilians I would agree because there are so
many that have written to us, we have so many
from the East who still want to come back but I
cannot really say to them 'It is true, go and
reside in such and such a place' because if he
comes back and something happens to him I will
have the feeling that it is my responsibility to
save the life of that individual and I told him to
come back and he has been killed.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The Easterner who wanted to
come back to the North I tried actively to stop
because I know the Easterner, I know what he is
going to do when he goes back to the North and
I would be grateful if you discourage him.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: I encouraged some and
discouraged some because I feel it is my
responsibility. This was what made me face the
mutiny in Kano, soldiers were ready to shoot me
but all the same it is my responsibility to save
lives and I did it. However, I feel that on the
civilian side we can do it gradually but at the
Army level that will give us great difficulty. I feel
we should concentrate now on the form of
association we want at the higher level not
promises that an Eastern soldier and a Northern
soldier can mix together tomorrow, the chances
of their mixing together is about 35 per cent but
not up to 45 per cent yet. I think that the form
of Government that we should have should be
discussed at the higher level and then we can try
within our territories to bring confidence back
gradually. We may say that the confidence is
there but right at the bottom it is not there and I
am sure Robert will]l agree. Even right now we
have divisions within the Regions in the North,
the West, the Mid-West, even in the East, the
Rivers people want to go. Therefore, we better
try to keep the big groups together at the
moment and gradually we start mixing together.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: I do not think I will recount the
details which have been mentioned but the
salient point which we want to consider is that
since there is no one person that has absolute
control of the Armed Forces, it is now difficult for
us to accept one authority and I think this is the
main point which Emeka has tried to make.
We can tackle it in two ways. First, by removing
the subject of objection in the lower group, that
is by separating the soldiers in the mean time to
build confidence until we can bring them
together.
Secondly, since we are working in good faith
among ourselves we have to repose the
responsibility for each group of the Army on
those personalities until we are in a position to
merge together. With this progression from a
Federal set up it only means we have to look
very closely into the central powers which are
supposed to be those of the Supreme
Commander and see how best we can limit these
in such a way that the actions are acceptable, to
the various Regions. I would like this body to be
maintained, the Supreme Military Council must
be maintained but we have to reconstruct the
duties or the powers of the Supreme Military
Council in order to give effect to the other
functions that will restore confidence within the
various Regions and then in general. I do not
think our answer here is to start re- organising
the Council but to look into the functions and to
specify very definitely what it can do and what it
cannot do. If we do that we would go a long way
in restoring confidence within the Regions. When
this is restored we hope gradually we shall build
up, it will be a matter of time and it will come
automatically but we will want a strong centre....
Col. Adebayo: I think I should come in here. Two
points have been made, one on the Government
side and the second which is inter-related to the
Government side, the Army. This is a Military
Government or Military rule and as such we are
military people and must get ourselves together
first. If we do not sort ourselves out I cannot see
how we can confidently rule the country. I agree
entirely with Emeka, Hassan and David. I think it
will be simpler on the Government side if we can
restore the confidence of the population which
we have not got at the moment. Even in the
West the Yorubas are afraid of moving around
with the Northern troops because they feel 'Well,
they have done something to the Easterners
may be it is our turn next....' I think I would
agree with the majority here that our association
should be tightened up at the top and see
whether we can bring that association down to
the ground when the time comes, when the
troops have more confidence in themselves. As
Jack and myself have always said, we do not
want to break the Army completely into pieces
because it will be very very dangerous to any
one of us if we break the Army into pieces. If we
can tighten up the Army on top then those who
are on top will gradually have the confidence of
the troops back but I agree entirely that we
must separate these troops.
If there are areas where some people can work
together, we can go into detail on that but in
general I think one should agree that there
should be separation from the bottom but not on
top.
On the Government side, the problem has been
half resolved. We agreed yesterday that our
Solicitors-General should get together on the
14th and see what part of the Decrees we can
repeal later on and submit their
recommendations. I think if we can go back as
at 14th January, 1966, Ithink half of the problem
on the Government side is resolved. Then if we
want to go through the functions of the Supreme
Commander and see what the Regions can take
on it will be all right. But, personally, I would say
we only repeal those Decrees that were passed
after 15th January, 1966 but I think we should
revert to what the country was as at 14th
January, 1966, that is Regional autonomy.
Lt.-Col. Ejoor: On that point, the implication is
that the Civilian Government will have to come
back.
Col. Adebayo: What we are doing is that we are
trying to get a solution for us Military people to
rule, the question of civilians coming back is a
different exercise altogether. You repeal all the
Decrees made that affected some of the powers
of the Regional Governments.
In fact Decree No. 1 is one of them, there are
certain parts of Decree No. 1 which should be
repealed.... We can go through all the Decrees
that have been passed, that will solve our
problems and bring the Regional powers back to
the Regions....
If we agree on that I see no reason why we
should go through the functions and the powers
of the Supreme Commander because at the
Supreme Military Council a joint decision is
always made but unfortunately we could not
meet since July 29 and there are areas in which
the Federal Executive Council in Lagos could
meet without the Regional Governors but on
things affecting the Regions the Regional
Governors must either attend the meeting or be
consulted before passing it into law. If we all
agree that we repeal Decrees that affect
Regional powers and leave the Supreme Military
Council to continue and the Federal Executive
Council to continue I think half of our job is
done.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: Again, whilst I agree with Bob I
think what he has said has not gone far enough.
It has not gone far enough in that before
January 15 certainly the Armed Forces were one.
These are crucial to whatever we decide to do
and, therefore, whilst I agree that the Supreme
Military Council should stay, I feel that here we
must write it down in our decisions quite
categorically that the legislative and executive
authority of the Federal Military Government
shall be vested in the Supreme Military Council
because previously it had been vested in the
Supreme Commander.
Col. Adebayo: No.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: The actions have been such.
Col. Adebayo: Actions, yes.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: If we are not going to get
ourselves into another friction, I think this must
really be spelt out, 80 that, what I envisage is
that whoever is at the top is a constitutional
chap, constitutional within the context of the
Military Government. That is, he is the titular
head but he would only act when we have met
and taken a decision. It is in fact for that reason
that I suggested yesterday, so as not to get it
confused ever again, that whoever we choose
should be the Chairman of aMilitary Council.
Indeed, I have gone on to say or rather I would
like to say that he should again be a Titular
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and
that he shall perform such functions as are
performed by a Constitutional Head of State. By
so doing we have limited the powers, by so
doing our people will have the confidence that
whatever he says must at least have been
referred to us all and that we are doing it in the
best interest of the entirety rather than saying
that this chap is there he is a Northerner and
suspect every action of his, this chap is there an
Easterner, he must be pushing only Eastern
things for the Eastern good. If we spell it out as
I have just said I think we would go a long way.
I will go further and I will give you the papers of
what I suggest.
Papers passed to Members of the Supreme
Military Council
Major Johnson: Before we go into the details of
this, I would like to add one or two points.... We
must first of all face the social problems in our
country.
What you have just enumerated, I am sure, in
principle has been the intention of the Federal
Military Government since January. General
Ironsi, all of us will remember, used to say 'Look,
it is easy to be a dictator but it is not easy to try
not to be one.' There are several occasions when
he would say 'Look, we all take these decisions'
even at Council meetings and putting his hand
down he would say 'any comments.' I am sure
this has been the genuine intention of everybody
in the Military Government, nobody wants to be
a dictator. I know there could be technical
hitches, that in practice we have deviated from it
but from what you have said I am sure it is the
intention of every military member here, nobody
has got any personal aspiration, we are all just
longing to get this country back on its feet. So,
the decisions being taken jointly I am sure is
everybody's welcome.
The nomenclature now is something different.
Again, I tie this one up with social. This is why I
believe, let us remain with the nomenclature we
have got. Supreme Military Council, Federal
Executive Council, Regional Executive Council,
these are what we are talking about but it is
within us. We have said now that we must start
this thing from the top. If we know we want
unity eventually which we know cannot be built
now it is from the top and if we do not show the
genuine intention right from the top I do not see
what we are going to pass on to the lower
people. Those of us here now should know how
we want it to be functioning. We know we have
agreed, we are going to put it down there that
Supreme Commander you will be the man in
Lagos to do normal day to day things that were
done by the Ministers and this should be carried
out with Members of the Executive Council in
Lagos. He never takes any decision by himself
for all I know although there could be some
hitches as I have said and things to include the
Regions the Regional Governments will come in
and if it is not important they send a memo for
them to comment. We say this is what we have
agreed upon and it goes on. I do not think we
should deviate from this....
Gentlemen, it is not anybody's intention to
remain head-up in Nigeria, it is not anybody's
ambition that he wants to be Governor. It has
come on us and we are doing national service
now for our country. When they talk about the
history of Nigeria because after all 10 years in
our lives is a long time but in the life of a nation
it, is a very small time. We are going to pass
away one day but what are we going to give to
posterity, that is what we should think about
now. Personal ambition, what this man should be
or that man, we must forget it.
I welcome what Col. Ojukwu said, we take a
joint decision, that is what we have been doing
but the nomenclature I say, let it remain....The
only thing I would like to add is because of the
state of the Army itself today I would like to see
an effective Commander of the Army. I would
like to have an effective Commander and on top
of that I would like to see that we break the
command of the Army into Area commands. I
hate to use Regional commands, I would say
Area commands and have effective command on
the Area commands and then an effective
command for the Army itself. That will assist the
Supreme Commander himself from going into
detail on Army matters. He can still be the Head
of the Armed Forces but that will assist him in
going into detail on Army problems. I do not
think personally that the Chief of Staff (Army) is
effective. He is the Staff Officer, I was Chief of
Staff, you were Chief of Staff and you all know
that we want somebody who can really
command, go to the ground everytime and see
that the Officers and the troops are doing the
right thing. That is what I would like to add to
what I said before but I think the nomenclature
should remain.
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I will object completely to that
last one. We started by agreeing that nobody
can effectively command the entire Army. Any
attempt to put somebody and say he commands
the entire Army is 'eyewash' it does not work,
not in the present circumstances. Therefore, we
must accept that the Army would be
Regionalised whether we like the name or not we
all understand what we mean by that.
I do not think what we need at the moment is
Supreme Commander because Supreme
Commander does involve commanding. I think
what you need is a Commander-in- Chief who is
just titular so that people will take orders from
people, at least, they have confidence in.
Whoever you put in Lagos, I say this, will not
command the loyalty of the East if that person is
not acceptable to the East, this is the fact of to-
day. So many things have happened and we do
no longer trust each other.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: This is taking us back on the
whole issue of Nigerian history....
Lt.-Col. Ojukwu: I said there should be a co-
ordinating group to which each Region would
send somebody but just for the facade of Nigeria
there should be a titular Commander-in- Chief
not a Supreme Commander which involves and
which means somebody who commands over
and above the various entities. Perhaps after we
have created and generated certain confidence
we could again have a Supreme Commander but
it is not feasible to-day this is w hat I am saying.
Lt.-Col. Hassan: With respect, to summarise the
whole thing the Eastern Region will not recognise
whoever is the Supreme Commander in the form
of association we are now in and it means a
repetition of the whole history of Nigeria when
the politicians were there, to strive to put either
a Northerner or an Easterner at the top. It must
be an Easterner for the Easterners to believe or
a Northerner for the Northerners to believe. To
summarise, the Eastern people will not recognise
anybody in Lagos unless he is an Easterner.
Col. Adebayo: I do not think we should put it
that way.
Mr. T. Omo-Bare: I would like to make a
statement. I would like to request with respect
that we adjourn to private session and iron out
this matter because there is a lot involved in it.
We cannot sit here on this round table and divide
Nigeria because the talks are moving towards
Regionalisation of everything and I do not think
it is safe and we are right to divide Nigeria up on
this table. If we retire into private session we
might be able to thrash it out there. We will be
able to say everything in our minds and then
come back with a Resolution.
Lt.-Col. Gowon: If that is agreed we can retire
then.
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